I have been asked to reflect on the European political scene as it has developed since the diaconal meeting in Bratislava seven years ago. To do that in a short time is not easy. I shall content myself by stating some headlines and making a brief comment on each of them. Some - you may think all of them - are rather obvious but I hope that this will at least serve to identify the context in which we are working. I also conclude that many of the things which have happened since 1994 have been developments and intensification of trends which were already in evidence then. On completing my notes I saw that they were generally pessimistic but I hope that we see part of our task as re-introducing hope and optimism, so that I hope that they will provoke a determination to look for positive results. So I turn to my ten theses.

First, today's world is increasingly less secure and more violent. What happened on 11 September in New York and Washington was in the context of Western industrial nations on an unprecedented scale. In other parts of the world there have been comparable or even greater civilian casualties - I think of Srebrenica and Rwanda - but it confirmed vividly and immediately that violent and warlike acts do not distinguish between civilians and combatants. There appear no longer to be rules and limits in play - something which gives rise to concern when thinking about the response to such acts. The ability to live in an open society seems under threat.

Second, many of the traditional categories of political discourse are less able to describe reality. At the moment the most clear example of that is the distinction between war and terrorism. What constitutes an act of war? What constitutes an act of terrorism? The practice of a formal declaration of war has apparently disappeared. What effect does that have on the international conventions designed to limit the effects of war and violence? Many of our definitions are now more blurred and/or difficult to sustain. Another example, the definition of a refugee made over 50 years ago largely in response to the human rights situation in Central and Eastern Europe has become problematic in a world in which persecution and economic hardship go hand in hand and are impossible to separate in the case of an individual.

Thirdly, there is a growing tendency to give priority to military and/or security based solutions to problems. Leave aside for the moment the situation after 11 September. Why did it take so long to see that the situation in South East Europe was not helped by a fire brigade approach once conflict broke out when the military solution was apparently the only possible response. It was only after Bosnia-Herzogovina and Kosovo that the concept of a Stability Pact for South East Europe was entertained. The response to the violence of some protesters at the summits of Seattle, Prague, Göteborg and Genoa was to erect security fences and to put heavily armed and equipped riot police onto the streets and to barricade the political leaders within security zones. Of course, you cannot have dialogue with those who refuse it, but the question of appropriate responses needs to be addressed.

That leads me to a fourth thesis which moves from the security sphere into that of politics and economics. Globalisation's positive effects are outweighed by a lack of global governance and the absence of transparent and democratic processes. It is clear that there are structures intended to enable decisions to be taken at global level. It has been increasingly clear that those structures are weighted in favour of the wealthy nations and that behind the wealthy nations there are a series of more shadowy players which have no obligation to public accountability. I don't intend to demonise trans-national corporations or to engage in ritual incantations against them. But they are not accountable to anyone other than their shareholders for the actions they take - and even the shareholders - often other corporations - have relatively little influence.

The fifth thesis builds on the negative side of globalisation. Even where economies become stronger, the number of socially excluded people increases and income and wealth distribution become more unequal. We do not have to look too far in Europe for examples of this. The 1999 report of the United Nations Development Programme on human development in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS gives a wealth of statistical detail to back that up and the stories which I expect we shall hear in the coming days will give that a human face. The forces introduced by globalisation, the drive to transform economies and societies and the impetus given by certain ideologues imported from North America and parts of Western Europe have created tragedy and the risk of tragedy where there should have been hope. But let us not forget that in perhaps a smaller but still significant measure the same process of social exclusion is going on in North America and Western Europe.

Sixthly and, I believe, at least in part consequently, people are becoming more and more disillusioned and frustrated by the democratic process. Increasingly participation in elections is decreasing as is support for many of the traditional political parties. There has been an appearance or resurgence of political parties which can be characterised with one or more words drawn from a list which includes populist, authoritarian, racist, sectarian, fascist, far-right. That phenomenon is found in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Rumania and, most recently, in certain multicultural parts of the United Kingdom. But the fact that many people also engage in single issue activities directed towards the protection of the environment or support for refugees and minorities and non governmental organisations lobby national governments and international bodies is perhaps another side of the same coin even if it is more in line with the thinking of those of us in this meeting.

Seventhly, in response to social exclusion and the threat to representative democracy, organisations are established within civil society to enable participation but politicians are unsure of the role of organised civil society. The growth of organised civil society, the willingness of people to become involved in political debate and action on issues and communities remains a sign of hope in Europe. It is no panacea. Within that almost undefinable concept called civil society, there are organisations which are at odds with one another. So it is not a coherent body of opinion. It is nevertheless a place of action and debate as has been most recently recognised in the White Paper on European Governance published by the European Commission. Yet I sense an ambivalence among politicians about civil society. Is the participation that it encourages a threat to representative democracy? Is it a tool for politicians to use by co-opting organised civil society to their own uses. That is a debate which still needs to be pursued with intensity and vigour.

Eighthly, we live in a world where the call for individual choice reduces the response of solidarity. While there are still many who seek to live in solidarity with their neighbours both near and far, there is a substantial trend towards consumption and the satisfaction of individual needs. The purpose of life is for many defined by what they are able to consume without thought for the neighbour or for the future. Part of the crisis in the rural world is a lack of solidarity between people in urban areas and those in rural areas. This thesis has its effect in another area.

Because ninthly, the market mechanism is applied to everything and the concept of public service is under question. There is a belief that everything can be given a price and that this can extend to public and social services. At the European Union level there are intentions to apply competition law to the provision of social services. It may be that in some areas the application of competitive discipline could lead to greater efficiency but in so many areas where competition has been introduced into public services, there have been ready providers for that which is easy and profitable. What is costly and financially unrewarding is allowed to slip or to be provided in an inferior quality.

Those of you who know me will be astonished that I could speak this long without mentioning the European integration process. I will not disappoint you. My tenth and final thesis is that the European integration process which should provide a response to many of these issues risks being a major casualty. The origins of the European Union lie in a desire to outlaw conflict by attending to the issues of peace, justice, reconciliation and solidarity. On the social front the last seven years have seen the development of national action plans on employment and social exclusion, the arrival of anti-discrimination legislation and the potential development of Union-wide migration policies; but they have also seen the development of more market-orientation at the expense of the social and much in the field of migration and asylum is questionable. I for one remain attached to the original vision and its possibility of renewal. In the last seven years, I have hoped that the process of enlarging the European Union would extend its benefits to the wider Europe. That could still be and it remains a hope for many in Central and Eastern Europe. But it was shown last year in the negotiations for the Treaty of Nice that the member states are no longer clear what the purpose of the integration process is. To counter the risk of this adventure falling apart under the pressure of national self-interest, they launched a process of public debate which is intended to define the purpose and form of European integration between now and the next negotiation in 2004. If the concept of a humane, socially and environmentally responsible, peace-promoting, open and democratic European Union can be given shape, then there is a chance that Europe can offer a hope of countering the negative forces which challenge the world today. But it is a challenge.