Position Paper of EECCS, 1996
Mr President, ladies and gentlemen,
The European Ecumenical Commission for Church and Society is the body which enables Protestant, Anglican and Orthodox churches in the European Union member states and other European countries to relate to the institutions of the European Union and the Council of Europe. Its task force on bioethics consists of specialists (scientists, theologians and a lawyer), representatives from European Protestant Churches and ecumenical associations in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the Nordic Council of Churches, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
We express our gratitude for the invitation to present a position paper on the Symposium on Medically Assisted Procreation and the Protection of the Embryo, organised by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.
We would like to mention that a number of our member churches and bodies have already internally worked on this difficult question and quite often produced papers on it.
The aim of this position paper of EECCS is to formulate an outlook on the issue at stake, which may be shared by the majority of believers in the member churches. Therefore, we have to make some preliminary remarks concerning the status of this paper.
The approach taken in our churches is to allow and encourage open dialogue on matters of faith and morals, guided by the Bible and the Holy Spirit. This is a different organising principle from the Magisterium within the Roman Catholic Church. The individual conscience and responsibility is taken very seriously. The task of the churches as institutions is to help believers to take their responsibility in everyday life. A general characteristic of the moral debate in our churches is that there is less confidence in "natural law" as a reliable basis for ethics.
The implication is that it is difficult to speak of "the" position of the member churches of EECCS. There is, rather, a plurality of positions. Concerning the status of the human embryo, one may, in general, find at least three clusters of opinions :
There is one cluster of opinions close to the official Vatican position. The human embryo is considered as a person to be, to such an extent that absolute protection is required.
At the other extreme one can find the position which equates the human embryo to human tissue, which implies that it may be used for research (under more or less strict conditions).
Between these two extremes, others try to take into account the development of the embryo. Under the right conditions - probably most embryos, for instance, are naturally aborted at an early stage - it develops to become a human person. Against this background many would argue for an increasing protection of the human embryo during the pregnancy.
In the light of what has been said above it is not the task of EECCS to choose one of these positions, let alone to speak a final word on the issues at stake. So, the position which is taken in this paper is not the official EECCS position, although we think that the majority of the church members may agree to it. We hope that it may foster the on-going debate concerning these delicate issues and that it may be of help to people who work in the biomedical field.
We wish to make clear at the outset that we cannot bury our heads in the sand over the development of the science and technology of human fertilisation. There already are (and will be) difficult questions as to what is allowed to be done with human embryos, for instance with "spare" embryos at the end of a storage period.
On the other hand however, there is no place for fatalism either. The crossing of new frontiers by science and technology is one of the characteristics of humankind. But this is not an excuse to say that we are powerless to halt the course of science. On the contrary, science and technology take place in a cultural, social and environmental context. We must take responsibility for deciding which developments Europe wishes to proceed with, and which it does not. Underlying motives must be recognised also. All technological developments, including medically assisted procreation, should serve "to make and to keep human life human", to use an expression of P. Lehmann. This implies that we should be aware that there are moral limits (the notion of "conscience des limites") and that we should look carefully to find them, not only individually but also in policy making. "Can do" does not imply "must do".
Concerning the human embryo and foetus, we want to point out that a human being is not to be reduced to its DNA (or genetic "make-up"). Christian anthropology does not allow a separation of biological and relational aspects. Biological life in itself cannot be given an absolute ontological significance, in isolation from the network of relations in which it appears and develops. That is why speaking about a human embryo as a future child, or a person to be, should take place in a relational context, more specifically in a parental or marital context.
Because fertilisation technology can contribute to the well-being and happiness of human beings, there is no reason to be a priori against its development and application. There is, however, reason to be very careful, for this technology has to do with the origin of human life and the handling of human embryos. Sooner or later, research in this area implies research on human embryos. And research on embryos is also relevant for other biomedical areas (for instance research on Parkinson's disease). We want to make clear that what has been developed to help childless couples should not be used as a key to open up other research areas. In short, a slippery slope is looming which makes the above-mentioned notion of (political) "conscience des limites" very important.
In this context, it may be important to emphasise (1) parental responsibility in creating a family. Family planning, including the use of contraceptives, is part of this responsibility, also in view of population growth in the world. And (2), although we do not want to deny the grief of childlessness, we would underline that human life can be meaningful and fruitful without having children. This is not just a theoretical point for us: it is based on experience of pastoral care in our Churches. Moreover, there is no right to a child nor a duty to have children. We uphold the Christian understanding of children as a gift and a responsibility. The emphasis should be put on the rights of children.
With IVF, however, we face a new problem, which is very difficult from a moral point of view. So called "spare embryos", which are, for one reason or another, not to be transferred into the womb, are in a peculiar position. They are artificially placed outside the parental context. As such they are still human embryos but, at least in practice, not future children or persons to be.
As it has been indicated above, in view of this vexing moral problem of spare embryos, opinions differ in our churches. Many people ask themselves (and the scientists!) whether we should bring ourselves into the position that we have to decide what to do with spare embryos. Other people, however, argue that the acceptance of IVF - certainly if the highest possible success rate is pursued - implies that we have to deal with the difficult moral question of what we should do with "spare" embryos. Those who hold this second position would conclude that, under very strict conditions, research on these embryos may be allowed (perhaps merely in connection with fertility treatment).
In view of the complexity of the issue and the danger of a slippery slope, we (i.e. the EECCS working group) find ourselves close to the old saying "in dubiis abstine" ("if in doubt, don't"). For some of us this means that non-therapeutic embryo research should be prohibited, whereas others prefer a strict no-unless-position, which means that a piece of research is not allowed unless and until the researcher can give sufficient cause to justify doing it. This implies a case by case approach, a broadly based multidisciplinary licensing body to monitor and control the research, a legal framework which clearly indicates the limits within which such a research may be possible.
We realise that one of the consequences of fertilisation technology is pre-implantation diagnosis and the possibility of human genetic modification. This is an uncomfortable subject to contemplate because of its association with eugenics, a concept charged with negative experience in (Western) history.
However, it makes sense, here, to distinguish between therapeutic and non-therapeutic eugenics. The possibility of preventing severe congenital diseases and disorders may be welcomed, although there will be a "grey area" between both forms of eugenics. We would suggest that, at least at first, until the "grey area" is better understood and clearer distinctions can be made, research and clinical efforts should be concentrated on the most obvious therapeutic cases, severe and life-threatening congenital diseases.
We must also distinguish clearly between wishing to have a child and wishing to have a "perfect" child. Moreover, we should be aware of the "tyranny of normality". That is to say, there is a danger that our societies begin, with our new knowledge, to make some level of health, and particularly the absence of certain so-called genetic "defects", into a kind of societal norm. By comparison with this norm, anyone with a "defect", or any foetus diagnosed to carry a "defect", is regarded as "abnormal" and in some sense less than a full member of human society. The churches wish to alert the Council of Europe to this possibility. In contrast, our evaluation of all human persons is their unique worth or dignity as children of God, without regard for their ability or disability, genetic or otherwise.
We sincerely hope our position represents a positive contribution to the process of elaborating, as soon as possible, a protocol to the Convention, on the protection of the human embryo.
Presented by Professor Egbert Schroten (Netherlands)
philosopher and theologian,
Director of the Centre for Bioethics and Health, Utrecht University